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Abstract
Several innovative software applications such as those
required by ambient intelligence, the semantic grid,
e-commerce and e-marketing, can be viewed as open soci-
eties of heterogeneous and self-interested agents in which
social order is achieved through norms. For agents to par-
ticipate in these kinds of societies, it is enough that they
are able to represent and fulﬁll norms, and to recog-
nise the authority of certain agents. However, to volun-
tarily be part of a society or to voluntarily leave it, other
characteristics of agents are needed. To ﬁnd these char-
acteristics we observe that on the one hand, autonomous
agents have their own goals and, sometimes, they act on be-
half of others whose goals must be satisﬁed. On the other,
we observe that by being members, agents must com-
ply with some norms that can be in clear conﬂict with
their goals. Consequently, agents must evaluate the pos-
itive or negative effects of norms on their goals before
making a decision concerning their social behaviour. Pro-
viding a model of autonomous agents that undertake this
kind of norm reasoning is the aim of this paper.
1. Introduction
Agent technology continues to contribute to the devel-
opment of applications required in ambient intelligence, the
semantic grid, electronic commerce and electronic market-
ing [6, 15, 16], all of which require open societies of het-
erogeneous and self-interested components. This is true if
the agents are autonomous and can chose whether to be part
of such societies voluntarily. In order to avoid the problems
that might potentially arise due to conﬂicts between the self-
interested agents, each representing the particular interests
of a human agent, norms can provide the required means to
regulate the behaviour of such participants [2, 3].
If agents are to be able to participate in a society reg-
ulated by norms, it is enough that they can represent and
fulﬁll norms, and recognise the authority of certain agents.
Moreover, in order to make decisions about whether or not
they voluntarily join or leave such a society, we argue that
these agents will need to have particular characteristics that
are additional to autonomy. Autonomous agents, which can
weigh the advantages of competing and conﬂicting goals,
can therefore take balanced and informed decisions on join-
ing societies whose norms may sometimes hinder the satis-
faction of the agent’s individual goals. This paper presents
a model for such normative autonomous agents.
The autonomy needed to take decisions regarding norms
leads us towards the possibility of norm infringement. This
negative social behaviour is often found in humans, but may
be an undesirable characteristic for computational entities.
Some might even argue that one of the purposes of norms
is to avoid conﬂicts among agents and to achieve coordina-
tion, so that conﬂicts of interests would arise immediately
if agents were allowed to violate rules. We agree with this
position but argue that although norms avoid conﬂicts be-
tween agents, they are the cause of some conﬂicts and, con-
sequently, their infringement is an important issue to inves-
tigate. In our view, any adequate model of norms for au-
tonomous agents must clearly address the consequences of
agents willfully violating norms, for three reasons: ﬁrst be-
cause individual goals can conﬂict with society norms; sec-
ond because the norms of a society may themselves con-
ﬂict in some situations; and third because the agent may be
a member of more than one society.
To address how the agent should deal with the ﬁrst of
these problems, some authors advocate socially responsible
agents who choose society goals over individual goals [5].
However, we argue that any adequate account of such sit-
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uations needs to consider agents who make decisions be-
tween conﬂicting goals based on their motivations, where
agents may prefer to suffer the consequences of their ac-
tions when satisfying a goal that conﬂicts a norm. Agents
with the ability to autonomously determine which norms to
fulﬁll, and which societies to be a part of, are clearly neces-
sary if we wish computational entities to automatically cre-
ate open societies with others. We refer to such entities as
autonomous normative agents, and in this paper we take an
existing model of agents and develop it to understand how to
construct agents that can autonomously reason about norms.
This approach differs from other approaches where new ar-
chitectures are developed from scratch [1], or which are
only concerned with norm compliance[7]. In Section 2, the
basic foundational components are introduced, while Sec-
tion 3 considers the types of reasoning involved to decide
when to join, stay in and leave societies. Then, we develop
an account of how agents can reason about why they should
comply with norms, before concluding.
2. Normative Framework
We build upon our existing SMART agent framework [8]
in which motivations play the key role for understanding au-
tonomy. In the framework, an attribute represents a perceiv-
able feature of the agent’s environment, which can be repre-
sented as a predicate. An environmental state is then a set of
attributes. Subsequently, actions are discrete events that can
change the state of environments, goals represents environ-
mental properties that an agent wishes to bring about, and
motivations are desires or preferences that affect the out-
come of the reasoning intended to satisfy an agent’s goals.
We assume that each agent has a unique name that allows
us to differentiate one agent from another. Deﬁnitions in the
Z speciﬁcation language are given below.
[Attribute,Motivation,AgentName]
EnvState == P1 Attribute; Goal == P1 Attribute;
Action == EnvState → EnvState
In SMART, agents are described as entities with at-
tributes representing their permanent features, capabilities
as actions that can be performed, and a set of current goals
to bring about. Autonomous agents are deﬁned as agents
with motivations representing the preferences that drive be-
haviour and the adoption and creation of goals. By omit-
ting details not relevant here, and introducing beliefs as the
agent’s internal representation of its environment, an au-
tonomous agent can be formally represented as follows.
AutonomousAgent
attributes : P1 Attribute; name : AgentName
capabilities : P1 Action
goals : P1 Goal ; beliefs : P1 Attribute
motivations : P1 Motivation
In general, agents have different sets of motivations so
that their individual preferences towards particular goals are
different. In order to model this, we introduce an impor-
tance value of a set of goals, with respect to the current mo-
tivations, such that the greater this value the more important
the goals. Explaining how this value can be obtained is be-
yond the scope of the paper, but we assume that there is a
function for this purpose. Note that since this value depends
on an agent’s motivations, any change to them can lead to
changes in an agent’s preferences. Thus, an agent could de-
cide to enter a society in order to satisfy an important goal
and, after some time, it could then decide to leave the soci-
ety if the importance of the goal decreases.
imp : (PMotivation × PGoal) → N
Next, we introduce a model of norms, the arte-
facts within a society that inﬂuence the behaviour of its
members. Norms can be characterised by several differ-
ent aspects. First, norms must be complied with by a set
of addressee agents in order to beneﬁt another (possi-
bly empty) set of agents. They specify what ought to be
done and thus include normative goals that must be sat-
isﬁed by addressees. Sometimes, these normative goals
must be directly intended, while at other times their role
is to inhibit speciﬁc goals (as in the case of prohibi-
tions). Clearly, norms may only be applicable in certain
situations, and their activation therefore depends on a con-
text. However, there may also be exceptions when agents
are not obliged to comply. Lastly, norms may suggest cer-
tain punishments to impose on those addressees who do
not satisfy the normative goals and, possibly, a set of re-
wards when they do. Further details can be found in [12],
in which we also show how different kinds of norms, rang-
ing from obligations and prohibitions to social commit-
ments and social codes, can be represented, but the basic
model is given below.
Norm
addressees, beneﬁciaries : PAutonomousAgent
context , exceptions : EnvState
ngoals, rewards, punishments : PGoal
addressees = ∅ ∧ context = ∅
Now, in order to determine if a norm has been fulﬁlled,
the satisfaction of its associated normative goals must be
veriﬁed. This is true if the normative goals are a logical con-
sequence of the current environmental state. We omit the
formal details of this standard operator.
A normative agent is an agent whose behaviour is partly
determined by obligations it must comply with, prohibitions
that limit the kind of goals that it can pursue, social commit-
ments that have been created during its social life and social
codes that may not carry punishments, but whose fulﬁllment
could represent social satisfaction for the agent. Moreover,
autonomous agents can decide whether to adopt or ignore
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norms. Here, we simply deﬁne a normative agent as an au-
tonomous agent with adopted norms; the mechanisms for
controlling behaviour are speciﬁed later.
NormAgent
AutonomousAgent
norms : PNorm
Then, a normative multi-agent system (NMAS) is deﬁned
as a set of normative agents (members) and the set of all
norms (systemnorms) that govern each member. Some of
the norms are legislative (lgns), while others punish non-
compliance (enfns) or reward compliance (rwns). The au-
thorities (authorities) of a NMAS are deﬁned as all the ad-
dresses of either a legislation, an enforcement or a reward
norm. Details of this can be found elsewhere [13].
NMAS
members : PNormAgent
systemnorms, lgns, enfns, rwns : PNorm
authorities : PNormAgent
∀ ag : members •
ag .norms ∩ systemnorms = ∅
3. Autonomous Membership
In accordance with our notion of autonomy, autonomous
agents must express their preferences for being part of a
particular relationship, group, organisation or society. Thus,
agent motivations are key to understanding why agents join
and stay in a society, why agents recognise the power and
authority of others, and why they adopt and comply with
the norms of a society. That is, agents join new societies as
a means of achieving some of their individual goals or of
achieving them more effectively. As long as this is the case,
the rational choice would be to stay and therefore respect
authority and norms. Software agents that search informa-
tion in large private databases must agree, for instance, to
respect conﬁdentiality and copyright norms, before being
allowed to access the required information.
Now, as members of a society, agents can also acquire
certain responsibilities, which may not be dismissed as soon
as they achieve their goals. For instance, an agent that joins
a credit bureau to get money cannot leave the bureau until it
fulﬁlls its commitment to repay the money it borrowed. The
following subsections are aimed at modelling an agent’s de-
cisions to enter and remain in a society.
3.1. Joining a Society
In general, autonomous agents join societies because
some of their goals can be satisﬁed, or satisﬁed more eas-
ily. However, it is clear that some goals may be hindered by
the society’s norms. Moreover, an agent receives advantages
and disadvantages from the direct application of norms;
contributions may be received from the norm-based respon-
sibilities of others, and responsibilities may be acquired by
activated norms in which they are addressed. Clearly, in or-
der to decide whether to be part of a society, the advantages
and disadvantages must be weighed against each other.
In order to specify this assessment, we ﬁrst deﬁne the set
of all norms that an agent has to comply with, which we call
relevant norms.
relevant : (NormAgent ×NMAS ) → PNorm
∀ ag : NormAgent ; nmas : NMAS ;
nms : PNorm • relevant (ag ,nmas) = nms
⇔ (∀n : nms • (ag ∈ n.addressees
∧ n ∈ nmas.systemnorms))
The next functions extract normative goals, punishments
and rewards from a set of norms, respectively. Only details
of the ﬁrst of these functions are provided; the others are de-
ﬁned similarly.
normgoals, punishgoals, rewardgoals :
PNorm → PGoal
∀ns : PNorm •
normgoals ns =
⋃{n : ns • n.ngoals}
The responsibilities of an agent in a society are those
goals that must be satisﬁed by the agent whilst it is a mem-
ber.
responsibilities : (NormAgent ×NMAS )
→ PGoal
∀ ag : NormAgent ; nmas : NMAS •
responsibilities(ag ,nmas) =
normgoals (relevant (ag ,nmas))
Agents can obtain contributions to their goals either as
beneﬁciaries of current system norms or from the rewards
of the norms they are currently fulﬁlling. The function
nbeneﬁts determines all the norms in a society that bene-
ﬁt the agent, while contributes , determines those goals for
which the agent ﬁnds some beneﬁt from norms. The details
are omitted here due to space constraints.
nbeneﬁts : (NormAgent ×NMAS ) → PNorm
contributes : (NormAgent ×NMAS ) → PGoal
An agent then needs to evaluate how their responsibili-
ties to and their contributions from a society compare. Not
only must contributions provide some beneﬁts for their im-
portant goals, but the new responsibilities must not hinder
goals that are more important than those goals that bene-
ﬁt. To formalise this, we declare a function which, given
two sets of goals, generates those goals in the ﬁrst set that
are hindered by the goals of the second. We deﬁne an anal-
ogous function for beneﬁts.
hinder , beneﬁt : (PGoal × PGoal) → PGoal
We deﬁne a Society Agent as a normative agent that has
a model of the societies of which it is a member as well as
maintaining a model of itself.
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SocietyAgent
NormAgent
self : NormAgent
societies : PNMAS
self .name = name
∀ s : societies • self ∈ s.members
Now, every time an agent decides to join a new soci-
ety, the evaluation of both its responsibilities and the con-
tributions it can receive should be calculated. Agents eval-
uate the goals that can be hindered by their responsibilities
and the goals that can beneﬁt from the contributions they re-
ceive from the society. Then, the goals that beneﬁt from so-
ciety contributions must be more important than the goals
hindered by an agent’s responsibilities. We call this con-
straint the social satisfaction condition which, if fulﬁlled,
enables an agent to enters the society, adopting the corre-
sponding society’s norms. However, this does not mean that
these norms will be complied with, since the motivations of
an agent might lead it to drop a norm.
The process that represents an agent’s decision to enter
a new society is represented in the JoinSociety schema,
in which the new? variable represents the society that the
agent is considering. The ﬁrst predicate states that the agent
is not currently a member of this society. The second predi-
cate is the social satisfaction condition evaluated in the new
society. The third predicate represents the agent accepting
the society by including it in the set of societies to which it
belongs. However, we do not update the global system state
to record the fact that not only does the agent model itself
as being part of this society but that it has actually joined
this society. Finally, the last predicate represents the agent
adopting the norms of the accepted society.
JoinSociety
∆SocietyAgent
new? : NMAS
new? ∈ societies
let scgs == contributes(self ,new?) •
let args == responsibilities(self ,new?) •
let ms == self .motivations •
(imp(ms, beneﬁt (goals, scgs)) ≥
imp(ms, hinder (goals, args)))
societies ′ = societies ∪ {new?}
norms ′ = norms ∪ relevant (self ,new?)
3.2. Staying in a Society
Once agents are in a society, the satisfaction of their im-
portant goals is not the only reason they remain there. Hu-
mans, for example, do not emigrate to other societies for
several reasons [2] such as not being aware of other soci-
eties, being unable to predict the beneﬁt of joining a soci-
ety, being under threat not to leave, having moral commit-
ments to fulﬁll, having goals satisﬁed in the society, enjoy-
ing relationships with other members of a group, and so on.
In our model, we divide the reasons for remaining into
two classes relating to an agent’s goals and to its rela-
tionships. The ﬁrst class corresponds to those reasons that
cause the agent to enter the society. As long as impor-
tant goals continue to be satisﬁed and their responsibilities
do not hinder these important goals, agents will stay. The
StayForGoals schema below speciﬁes this situation. It rep-
resents a normative agent that has entered a society from
which norms have been adopted. This agent has a model of
the society represented by society . The predicate states that
the social satisfaction condition is currently satisﬁed.
StayForGoals
NormAgent
self : NormAgent
society : NMAS
self ∈ society .members
let scgs == contributes (self , society) •
let args == responsibilities (self , society) •
let ms == self .motivations •
(imp (ms, beneﬁt (goals, scgs)) ≥
imp (ms, hinder (goals, args)))
In the second group of reasons, an agent assesses its re-
lationships with other agents; it can decide to stay in a soci-
ety in any of the following cases.
• The agent has already decided to comply with norms
but their fulﬁllment has not yet occurred.
• The agent feels obliged to reciprocate to some agents
in the society.
• The agent is part of a group of supportive agents and
one of them, which is also a member of the society,
needs its help.
• The agent is being coerced by a member of the society
to remain there.
In the ﬁrst case, the agent is simply being consistent with
the normative decisions it has made. In the last three cases,
the agent recognises special relationships with some other
members of the society. We discuss each case separately in
the remainder of this section.
An agent stays in a society when it has decided to comply
with norms that have not yet been fulﬁlled. Here, the agent
shows its respect for the commitments it has with other
agents. This case is formalised in the StayingtoComply
schema where intended represents those norms the agent
has decided to comply with. The mechanism for selecting
these norms is described in Section 4. The ﬁrst predicate
states that the agent is currently a member of the society,
the second states that there are some norms of the society
that the agent has decided to comply with (i.e. they are in-
tended norms), and the third states that the agent believes
that one of those norms has not yet been fulﬁlled.
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StaytoComply
NormAgent
self : NormAgent
intended : PNorm
society : NMAS
self ∈ society .members
(intended ∪ society .systemnorms) = ∅
∃n : intended •
(n ∈ (intended ∪ society .systemnorms) ∧
¬ fulﬁlled(n, beliefs))
Reciprocating actions has been considered as one of the
key aspects underlying society cohesion [10]. Agents that
have worked in support of the goals of others generally
expect to receive reciprocal beneﬁts, even if not explicitly
agreed. This represents an ethical matter in which agents
must show their gratitude to others, and could offer a way
to increase trust between them. Since adoption of goals is
made formal through commitments [11], and we are consid-
ering commitments as types of norms, an agent can deter-
mine if it must reciprocate to another agent as follows: ﬁrst,
there is a norm that has been complied with whose beneﬁts
were enjoyed by the ﬁrst agent; second, the norm was com-
plied with by the second agent; third, the norm did not in-
clude either punishments or rewards. This last condition is
very important because it is the difference between doing
something by being forced (coerced or rewarded) or by be-
ing just helpful. We specify the situation in which an agent
remains in a society in order to reciprocate in this way, in
StaytoReciprocate . The ﬁrst predicate states that the agent
is currently a member of the society, the second that it be-
lieves that there is an agent in its society that complied with
a norm from which it has beneﬁted and, further, that this
agent was not forced to do so.
StaytoReciprocate
NormAgent
self : NormAgent
society : NMAS
self ∈ society .members
∃ a : society .members •
(∃n : society .systemnorms •
(a ∈ n.addressees ∧
fulﬁlled(n, beliefs) ∧
name ∈ n.beneﬁciaries ∧
n.rewards = ∅ ∧ n.punishments = ∅))
Support relationships enable small groups to work well.
Agents are empowered because they recognise the poten-
tial for unconditional help from others without any notion
of reciprocation. We call this a supportive group. The way
in which these groups are created can range from a design
decision to a complex on-line mechanism in which agents
voluntarily decide to group together, but that is beyond the
scope of this paper. Here, we simply assume that each agent
has the means to identify such a group of normative agents
that must be able to comply with any commitments that ben-
eﬁt other agents in the group. An agent stays in a society if
it is part of a supportive group and one of the members in
both the same society and group needs its help. We use the
StayWithFriends schema to formalise this situation, which
now includes the notion of the group. The agent is a mem-
ber of the group and the group is a subset of the society. Fur-
ther details are omitted here but can be speciﬁed in a similar
manner to the schema above.
StayWithFriends
NormAgent
group : PNormAgent
self : NormAgent
society : NMAS
self ∈ group
group ⊆ society .members
Even when the social satisfaction condition is not be-
ing fulﬁlled, an agent may stay in a society if another soci-
ety member is able to hinder a goal of the ﬁrst agent; this
is more likely to occur if the ﬁrst agent leaves. This means
that although an agent’s responsibilities are more than the
social contributions the agent can receive, there is a more
important goal that can be hindered if it decides to aban-
don the society. The formal representation of this is given
in the StaybyCoercion schema. It describes ﬁrstly that the
social satisfaction condition is not being fulﬁlled. Secondly,
that the agent believes that it has a goal that can be hindered
by another member of the society. Thirdly, that such a goal
is more important than the goals hindered by the agent’s re-
sponsibilities. Its ﬁnal predicate represents the fact that if
the agent is not a member of the society this implies that the
goal will not be among its goals.
StayingbyCoercion
NormAgent
self : NormAgent
society : NMAS
self ∈ society .members
let scgs == contributes (self , society) •
let args == responsibilities (self , society) •
let bgoals == beneﬁt (goals, scgs) •
let hgoals == hinder (goals, args) •
let ms == self .motivations •
(importance(ms, bgoals) <
importance(ms, hgoals) ∧
(∃ g : goals • (∃ ag : society .members •
(∃ g1 : ag .goals ∧ hinders(g1, g)))) ∧
importance (ms, {g}) ≥
importance (ms, hgoals) ∧
self ∈ society .members ⇒ g ∈ goals)))
All these cases can be combined through logical disjunc-
tions to represent an agent’s decisions to stay in a society
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due to the relationships (or ties) it has with other agents in
the society as follows.
StayForTies ==
StaybyCoercion ∨ StayWithFriends ∨
StaytoReciprocate ∨ StaytoComply
3.3. Adopting new Norms
Modelling agents able to adopt new norms au-
tonomously is an important step towards understanding
dynamic societies in which changes in current legisla-
tion might occur, society members are not necessarily
predetermined, and where relationships between mem-
bers are created and destroyed dynamically. Enabling
agents to adopt new norms allows both the independent de-
sign of these agents (because they do not need prior knowl-
edge of the norms they must fulﬁll), and the possibility for
agents to join or leave a society without changing their in-
ternal design. In addition, since norms represent the respon-
sibilities of agents, and norms are different in each society,
agents become able to adopt different roles and obliga-
tions. Moreover, the ability to adopt norms enables agents
to make agreements with other agents at run-time, to ei-
ther adopt or delegate their goals. Initially, the process of
norm adoption received little attention from the agent re-
search community as they were considered as built-in
constraints [17], but recent approaches have incorpo-
rated the notion of generation of new norms [9].
Norm adoption can be better deﬁned as the process
through which agents recognise their responsibilities to-
wards other agents by internalising the norms that spec-
ify these responsibilities. The importance of norm adop-
tion as a voluntary process has been already pointed out by
many [1, 3, 4], but their research, rather than explaining why
norms are adopted, describes the cases in which norms must
be rejected. These cases include situations in which: the is-
suer is not an authority; the norms are not within the compe-
tence of an authority; addressees are not under the author-
ity’s domain; the context in which norms are issued is not
appropriate; norms are issued to satisfy an authority’s per-
sonal interest; or norms are not intended to be beneﬁcial for
the group. However, not all of these can be taken as general
conditions to reject norms. For instance, recognising when
norms are issued to satisfy the personal interests of the is-
suer is not an easy task and, although this might be impor-
tant for societies in which the primary objective is the equal-
ity of the members, it is too restrictive for other kinds of so-
cieties or groups. For example, suppose that a businessman
wants to create a private enterprise, and one of his goals is
to obtain proﬁt. The majority of the enterprise’s norms will
be issued in order to guarantee the achievement of this goal.
Although the norms represent the businessman’s interests,
employees adopt them, and as long as they want to remain
in the organisation. This suggests that the motives for is-
suing a norm do not always coincide with the motives for
adopting the norm, and a balance of interests must exist be-
tween issuers and addressees of a norm.
The concept of authority refers to the power assigned ac-
cording to norms and accepted as legitimate by all members
of a society. As long as agents want to belong to the well-
deﬁned social structure, they must adopt the norms issued
by its recognised authority. Thus, for a norm to be adopted,
the following conditions must be satisﬁed:
• the agent must recognise itself as an addressee;
• the norm must not already be adopted;
• the norm must have been issued by a recognised au-
thority; and
• the agent must have a reason for staying in the society.
The formal representation of the ﬁrst three conditions is
given in the schema below. The newnorm? variable and
issuer are given as input. The predicates state that the norm
must be directed to the agent, the norm is not currently
adopted, the norm is related to the issuer and the issuer is
an authority of the society. If all these conditions are satis-
ﬁed, then the norm is adopted by the agent.
NormAdoption
∆NormAgent
newnorm? : Norm
issuer?, self : NormAgent
issuedby : P(Norm ×NormAgent)
society : NMAS
name ∈ newnorm?.addressees
newnorm? ∈ norms
(newnorm?, issuer?) ∈ issuedby
issuer? ∈ society .authorities
norms ′ = norms ∪ {newnorm?}
The last condition represents the autonomous decision
of agents. That is, to adopt a norm of its own volition, an
agent must have reasons to do so. The formal represen-
tation is given below, where the schemas StayForGoals
and StayForTies are included to represent the fact that the
agent believes it has reasons to stay in the society.
AutonomousNormAdoption == (StayForGoals ∨
StayForTies) ∧ NormAdoption
4. Autonomous Norm Compliance
To explain what might motivate an agent to dismiss or
comply with a norm, and how these decisions may affects
their goals, we consider the process of autonomous norm
compliance and divide it into two separate sub-processes.
In the ﬁrst, the agent deliberates about whether to comply
with a norm (the norm deliberation process). In the second,
the agent updates its goals and intentions accordingly (the
norm compliance process). Both of these processes must
take into account not only the goals of agents, but also the
motivations of these goals (and, therefore, their importance)
and the mechanisms that the society has to avoid violation
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4.1. Norm Deliberation
To decide wether to comply with a norm, an agent must
assess three things: the goals that might be hindered by
satisfying the normative goals, the goals that might bene-
ﬁt from the associated rewards and, the damaging effects
of punishments (i.e. the goals hindered due to the satisfac-
tion of the goals associated with punishments). Since the
satisfaction of some of their goals might be prevented in
these cases, agents use the importance of their goals to make
these decisions. After norm deliberation, the set of intended
norms consists of those norms that are accepted to be com-
plied with by the agent, and the set of rejected norms. More
details of norm selection is provided elsewhere [14].
The state of an agent that has selected the norms it is keen
to fulﬁll is formally represented in the NormAgentState
schema. This represents a normative agent with the vari-
ables representing the sets of active, intended , and
rejected norms at a particular point of time. There, the
conﬂicting predicate holds for a norm if and only if its nor-
mative goals conﬂict with any of the agent’s current goals.
The next three predicates state that active norms are the sub-
set of adopted norms that the agent believes must be com-
plied with in the current state (i.e. those norms for which
the context matches the beliefs of the agent) and that,
the set of active norms has already been assessed and di-
vided into norms to intend and norms to reject. The state of
an agent is consistent in that its current goals do not con-
ﬂict with the intended norms and, consequently, no nor-
mative goal must be in conﬂict with current goals. More-
over, since rewards beneﬁt the achievement of some goals,
so that agents do not have to work on their satisfaction be-
cause someone else does, these goals must not be part of
the goals of an agent. The ﬁnal predicate states that pun-
ishments must be accepted and, consequently, none of the
goals of an agent must hinder them.
NormAgentState
NormAgent
activenorms, intended , rejected : PNorm
conﬂicting : PNorm
∀n : activenorms • conﬂicting n ⇔
hinder(goals,n.ngoals) = ∅
activenorms ⊆ norms
∀ an : activenorms • logcon (beliefs, an.context)
activenorms = intended ∪ rejected
hinder(goals,normgoals intended) = ∅
beneﬁt(goals, rewardgoals intended)∩
goals = ∅
hinder(goals, punishgoals rejected) = ∅
For a norm to be intended, some constraints must be ful-
ﬁlled, as follows. First, the agent must be an addressee of the
norm. Then, the norm must be an adopted and currently ac-
tive norm, and it must not be already intended. In addition,
the agent must believe that it is not in an exception state and,
therefore, it must comply with the norm. Formally, the pro-
cess to accept a single norm as input (newnorm?) to be
complied with is speciﬁed in the NormIntend schema. The
ﬁrst ﬁve predicates represent the constraints on the agent
and the norm as described above. The sixth predicate rep-
resents the addition of the accepted norm to the set of in-
tended norms while the set of rejected norms remains the
same (ﬁnal predicate).
NormIntend
newnorm? : Norm
∆NormAgentState
name ∈ newnorm?.addressees
newnorm? ∈ norms
newnorm? ∈ activenorms
newnorm? ∈ intended
¬ logcon(beliefs,newnorm?.exceptions)
intended ′ = intended ∪ {newnorm?}
rejected ′ = rejected
To consider a norm to be rejected, the agent must be an
addressee of it, the norm must be an adopted and active
norm, it must not already be intended, and the agent must
not be in an exception state. The process for rejecting an ac-
tive norm is deﬁned analogously to NormIntend but its de-
tails are omitted here. Both processes are used in combina-
tion with different strategies in [14] to describe how agents
decide whether a norm should be fulﬁlled.
4.2. Norm Compliance
Once agents take a decision about which norms to ful-
ﬁll, a process of norm compliance must be started in order
to update an agent’s goals according to the decisions it has
made. An agent’s goals are affected in different ways, de-
pending on whether the norm is intended or rejected. The
cases can be listed as follows.
• All normative goals of an intended norm must be
added to the set of goals because the agent has decided
to comply with it.
• Some goals are hindered by the normative goals of an
intended norm. These goals can no longer be achieved
because the agent prefers to comply with the norm and,
consequently, this set of goals must be removed from
the agent’s goals.
• Some goals beneﬁt from the rewards of an intended
norm. Rewards contribute to the satisfaction of these
goals without the agent having to make any extra ef-
fort. As a result, those goals that beneﬁt from rewards
must no longer be considered by the agent to be satis-
ﬁed, and must be removed from the set of goals.
• Rejected norms, by contrast, only affect the set of goals
hindered by the associated punishments. This set of
goals must be removed, and it is the way in which nor-
mative agents accept the consequences of their deci-
sions.
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To keep the model simple at this stage, we assume that
punishments are always applied, and rewards are always
given, though the possibility exists that agents never be-
come either punished or rewarded. In addition, note that the
set of goals hindered by normative goals can be empty if
the norm being considered is a non-conﬂicting norm, and
goals hindered by punishments or goals that beneﬁt from re-
wards can be empty if a norm does not include any of them.
The process to comply with the norms an agent has decided
to fulﬁll is speciﬁed in the NormComply schema. Through
this process the set of goals is updated according with our
discussion above.
NormComply
∆NormAgentState
let ngs ==
⋃{gs : PGoal | (∃n : intended •
gs = n.ngoals)} •
let hngs ==
⋃{gs : PGoal | (∃n : intended •
gs = hinder (goals,n.ngoals))} •
let brs ==
⋃{gs : PGoal | (∃n : intended •
gs = beneﬁt(goals,n.rewards))} •
let hps ==
⋃{gs : PGoal | (∃n : rejected •
gs = hinder (goals,n.punishments))} •
( goals ′ = (goals ∪ ngs) \ (hngs ∪ brs ∪ hps))
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have argued that the normative be-
haviour of agents not only relates to the decision of whether
to comply with a norm or not, but also to the decisions
of whether to join, to stay or to leave a society regulated
by norms. We have also argued that societies regulated
by norms and autonomous normative agents are key ele-
ments of modelling open societies of heterogeneous and
self-interested agents such as those required by many in-
novative software applications. In consequence, we have
presented a model of autonomous normative agents that
is based on a previously developed model of agents, and
on previously proposed models of norms and multi-agent
systems regulated by norms. To do this, we have extended
the notion of motivated autonomy from the SMART agent
framework to the normative decisions of agents. The model
thus considers the reasons for agents to enter a society, to
stay or leave a society depending on compliance with its
norms and how the most important goals of agents are af-
fected. We have also proposed models for the processes of
autonomous norm adoption and compliance. Our model of
agents, besides including many aspects not considered in
existing models, also has the advantage that it can be readily
incorporated into many BDI-like agent architectures. Fur-
ther work will be done to address the problems of imple-
menting the model.
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